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REVIEWS
THE WALL STREET SPECIALIST: KING OF THE JUNGLE
Donald Shelby Chisum*
THE WALL STREET JUNGLE. By Richard Ney. New York: Grove
Press, Inc., 1970. Pp. 348. $7.50.
The tone of The Wall Street Jungle is set in its preface: "[T] here is
more sheer larceny per square foot on the floor of the New York Stock
Exchange than any place else in the world."' The indicted principals
are the specialists on the floor of the Exchange.2 Accessories include
the whole Exchange establishment, insiders of the corporations whose
stocks are listed on the Exchange, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC), the Federal Reserve Board, and members of Congress,
all of whom are accused of acquiescing or even sharing in the special-
ists' plunder. A close examination of Mr. Ney's bill of particulars
reveals, however, that he exposes little about the persistent problem of
the specialist and his function in the securities exchange auction mar-
ket that has not already been debated in professional circles.3 In fact,
as a piece of scholarship, the Jungle is a jungle itself, suffering from a
lack of coherent organization. It contains glaring gaps in analysis, non
sequiturs, and unsupported hyperbolic assertions. Much of the text
either paraphrases or directly quotes a 114 page section of a single
government document-the SEC's 1963 Report of the Special Study
of Securities Markets.'
Mr. Ney's best-selling work is important nevertheless because he has
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington. A.B., 1966, LL.B., 1968,
Stanford University.
1. R. NEY, Tna WA=L STEET JUNoLE 8 (1970) [hereinafter cited as JUNGLE].
2. Ney directs his attack at both the New York and American Exchanges (since the
specialist system functions similarly on both) but concentrates on the former since
quantitatively it is the more significant.
3. See generally R. JENINGS & H. MARsr, SrcUmrras REGULATON CASES ANo
MATERIALS, 700-27 (2d ed. 1968); 2 L. Loss, SacUarnas REGULATION, 1201-08 (2d ed.
1961, Supp. 1969). S. ROBBINS, THE SEcURTIES MARKETS: OPERATIONS AM ISSUES, 191-
201 (1966).
4. SEC, REPoRT OP TIM SPECIAL SrTMY oF SECUarRIIS MARKETs, H.R. Doc. No. 95,
88th Cong. 1st Sess., pt H1, at 57-171 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SPEAL ST~nY].
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successfully popularized a technical problem in the operation of the
exchange markets for corporate securities. It now behooves the tech-
nicians and professionals to separate the wheat from the chaff in the
Jungle's harvest of accusations against the specialist system to the
satisfaction of the investing public.
I. SPECIALISTS AND THE AUCTION MARKET
To understand and evaluate Mr. Ney's accusations, a brief, simpli-
fied description of the exchange market and the specialist's functions
in it will be helpful.5 Stocks are traded on the floor of the New York
Stock Exchange in a "continuous auction system." Member firms
doing business with the investing public relay buy and sell orders from
their customers to their commission brokers on the floor who execute
the orders as agents. The floor contains a number of "posts," each
of which is the locus for trading of a number of stocks. A broker with
an order for a given stock goes to the proper post and joins the
"crowd" (i.e., participates in the auction). Buy and sell orders are
matched in a typical auction fashion-with each broker seeking the
best possible price for his principal.
Specialists, unlike commission brokers and other members,' do not
move about the floor, but are stationed at a given post where the stocks
in which they "specialize" are traded. The specialist performs two
distinct functions. As a broker, he acts as sub-agent for commission
brokers in the execution of "limit" and "stop" orders.' Since these
orders, unlike "market" orders,' can normally be executed only at a
5. See generally SPEcIAL SrTuDy 40-45.
6. Other members operating on the floor are "two dollar" brokers (independent
brokers who execute orders given to them by commission brokers as sub-agents, receiv-
ing as compensation part of the commission charged to the public customer), odd-lot
dealers (dealers who buy and sell "odd lots"-orders for less than the "round lot" stan-
dard trading unit of 100 shares-and adjust their positions as principals by the purchase
or sale of round lots), and registered floor traders (members who buy and sell securities
as principals for their own accounts).
7. A limit order is an instruction to buy at a given price or lower or to sell at a
given price or higher. A stop order is an instruction to sell at market when the price
declines to a specified level or to buy at market when it increases to a specified level.
SPEcIAL STDy 72. Both are included in the generic statutory term "limited price order"
in section 11 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78K(b) (1964).
8. A market order is an instruction to the agent to execute the order "at the most
advantageous price as promptly as reasonably practicable." SEC, REPORT ON THE FEASI-
BILITY AND ADVISABiLITY OF THE COMPLETE SEoEGATION r THE FuNcTioNs oF DEALER
AN BROKER 26 (1936), quoted in 2 L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1202.
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future time when the market price changes- to a given Jevel, -roving
commission brokers usually, entrust such. 9rders to the specialist
whose constant presence at the post assures prompt execution at the
proper time. The specialist records all his limit and stop orders in his
notorious "book."9 As a dealer, the specialist buys and sells his specialty
securities for his own account.
The specialist's broker function is clear enough, and its value to
exchange trading has never been questioned. His dealer function is more
complicated, however, and its combination with the broker function
has long been a source of controversy. The specialist participates in
the auction market for his specialty stocks primarily to "make a mar-
ket," that is, to smooth out temporary, very short-run imbalances in
the supply and demand for the stock. A simple example will illustrate
this function. Assume at time T, a broker comes to the post with a
market order to sell 100 shares of X stock. The specialist's book on X
contains limit orders to buy 200 shares at 20 and limit orders to sell
200 at 24. The last sale price was 22. If at time T, there is no broker
in the "crowd" with a market order to buy, and the specialist does not
participate as dealer, the transaction will be executed with the limit
order to buy on the book at its bid (20). At T + 1, a market order to
buy 100 shares arrives. If there is no market order to sell in the
"crowd," the transaction will be executed with the limit order to sell
on the book at its offer (24). At T + 2, a market sell order would be
executed at 20; at T + 3, a buy at 24. This discontinuity in successive
transaction prices (20,-24, 20, 24,)' is considered undesirable because
it enhances the uncertainty of the investing public as to the price at
which a given stock can be bought or sold at any given time. Dis-
continuity lessens the relevance of recent transaction prices as indicia
of a given stock's value.
In the above example, the specialist, participating as a dealer, could
and probably Would "narrow the slpread" between the bid and offer
9. Traditionally, the specialist's book is a 4 by 11 inch looseleaf binder with a page
for each dollar level. SPEcIAL SuY 72. The binder is being replaced by a computerized
system that will flash the specialists' orders onto a screen at the push of a button. Throw-
ing Out the Book?, BAmboN's July 6, 1970, at 3. Since the contents of the book is valuable
trading information-indicating the existing supply and demand for stocks-the 1934
Act forbids disclosure of it by the specialist except under specified circumstances. Secu-




quotations as set by the public orders. He would quote, for example,
21Y8 bid, 223/8 offer. The series of transactions would be at 217/8,
22Y8, 218, and 223/. The specialist would participate in the trans-
actions at a Y2 point profit, his compensation for adding continuity
to the market. That continuity is his establishing a reasonable rela-
tion between the price of successive transactions. Over the series,
his inventory of X shares would remain unchanged. Here the specialist
is able to exercise discretion by setting the exact transaction prices.
His quotation could as easily have been 215/-21Y/ or 22y8-22y8.
It is to the specialist's economic advantage not to narrow the spread
too much, since his compensation increases as the spread becomes
greater.10
Beyond this very short-run function, the specialist is expected by
Exchange policy to participate as a dealer to add "depth" and "con-
tinuity" to price movements." If the orders to sell (buy) a stock con-
sistently exceed those to buy (sell) at a given price, it is obvious that
the price must go down (up). The specialist cannot, should not, and
does not "stabilize" prices by indefinitely buying or selling against
the trend of orders to maintain a set price. However, he is supposed
to deal against the trend ("lean against the wind")-building an inven-
tory as the stock's price goes down, reducing it as the price goes up.
The effect is (1) a cushioning of intermediate price swings beyond or
away from long-run equilibrium levels that otherwise, it is thought,
would be too sharp, and (2) an added continuity in the price movement,
i.e., each transaction's price is only a small increment below (above)
the previous one.
The specialist, as broker and dealer, also exercises important con-
trol over the price at which his specialty stocks "open." The Exchange
is a "continuous auction market" only during a limited number of
hours during the business days each week. However, brokers accumu-
late orders to buy and sell at all hours. At the beginning of a trading
session, brokers give all their orders to the specialist who then deter-
10. SPEcIAL STUDY 86-88.
11. Rules 103 and 104 of the Board of Governors of the New York Stock Exchange,
quoted in R. JENNmcs & H. MARSH, supra note 3, at 721-22; see Wolfson & Russo, The
Stock Exchange Specialist: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 1970 DuKE L.J. 707, 714-
17, 727-29.
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mines the opening price at which all orders are executed.- For example,
if the specialist is given orders to sell 1,000 shares of Y stock and to
buy 800 shares of Y stock and the previous closing price was 22, the
price will normally be lowered at the open. If the specialist has a limit
order to buy 200 shares at 20 on his book (and none higher), the price
would drop to 20 unless (as is likely) the specialist himself steps in to
buy for his own account. If he does participate, he could set the open-
ing price at anywhere from 20Y8 on up. He could -even set the price
above 22 despite the preponderance of sell orders if he buys for his own
account or uses available orders on his book. Normally, however, the
latter course of action would violate the rules of the Exchange." In
any case, it is again obvious that the specialist enjoys a great deal of
discretion in setting the opening price which, in turn, is of great in-
fluence on successive transaction prices.
II. REGULATION OF SPECIALIST ACTIVITY
Criticism of the power and position of specialists has been leveled at
nearly every aspect of their activity but has centered around (1) the
inherent conflict of interests to which the specialist is subject, (2) the
power over price movements in his speciality stocks that he possesses
and the valuable knowledge as to the available supply and demand
for those stocks that he gets from his book-both of which can be
used for his personal trading profit as a dealer, and (3) the extent to
which specialists through their dealings for their own accounts actually
contribute to the depth and continuity of the market. The response
to these criticisms has always been to isolate abuses and practices
easily subject to abuse, to set standards of conduct for specialists, and
to implement more and better means of surveillance to detect non-
12. SpscrAL STuDy 137-42.
13. Participation at openings or reopenings. A specialist should avoid participating
as a dealer in opening or reopening a stock in such a manner as to upset the public
balance of supply and demand as reflected by market and limited price orders,
unless the condition of the general market or the specialists' position in light of the
reasonably anticipated needs of the market makes it advisable to do so. He may,
however, buy and sell stock as a dealer to minimize the disparity between supply
and demand at an opening or reopening.
Note to Rule 104 of the Board of Governors of the New York Stock Exchange, quoted in
R. jmmwGs & H. MAaSH, supra note 3, at 724.
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compliance with the standards. Radical suggestions for reform, such as
the segregation of the specialist broker function and the dealer market-
making function or the abolition of the market-making function, have
consistently been rebuffed.14
The activities of specialists acting as dealers are regulated by section
11(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,'" SEC Rule 1lb-1, 6
and Rules 103 and 104 of the Rules of the Board of Governors of the
New York Stock Exchange.' Cumulatively, these require specialists
to participate as dealers for their own accounts in order to assist in the
maintenance of a "fair and orderly" market and prohibit them from
dealing except for that purpose. The rules generally condemn such
specific specialist dealer abuses as "cleaning up the book," "cleaning up
the market," and "reaching across the market."' The Exchange scru-
tinizes specialists' dealings to detect non-compliance with the standards
-that is, to determine whether the specialists' dealer transactions are
"stabilizing" (against the price trend) or "destabilizing" (with the
price trend).' The 1963 Special Study found Exchange surveillance
14. In 1934, Congress directed the SEC to report on the "feasibility and advisability
of the complete segregation of the functions of dealer and broker," which would include
specialists. Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, § 11(e), 48 Stat. 891. The SEC's report, pub-
lished in 1936, concluded that segregation was not advisable. See note 8, supra. The
Special Study concluded that there was no need for "any broad and drastic change in
the system" as it now exists. SPECIAL STUDY 167.
15. Securities Exchange Act § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78K(b) (1964).
16. 17 C.F.R. § 240. llb-1 (1970). Prior to 1965 there was no formal SEC rule
relating to specialist regulation. SEC policy was expressed in an administrative inter-
pretation of Section 11(b) known as the Saperstein Interpretation. See S. ROBBINS, supra
note 3, at 195; Wolfson & Russo, supra note 11, at 717-21.
17. Quoted in R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 3, at 721-22.
18. "Cleaning up the book" is the purchase by the specialist of all the stock offered
on the book at the last preceding price or the supplying of all the stock bid for on the
book at the last sale price. SPECIAL STUDy 81. "Cleaning up the market" is the purchase
of all the stock offered in the market or the supplying of all the stock bid for in the
market. Id. at 93. "Reaching across the market" is the initiation of a transaction by the
specialist by buying at the offer or selling stock at the bid (whether the orders are on the
book or in the crowd) rather than waiting for someone to trade. Id. at 109. All are
considered abuses because they are not necessary to maintain price continuity and may
create or accentuate price movements. The Exchange has always maintained that a
specialist has a greater right to "reach across the market" to liquidate a position than to
establish a position. This is based on an avowed need for "business survival"-even
though such liquidation is in competition with public customers' orders and may ac-
centuate a price drop. Id. at 121-23.
19. The Exchange has traditionally used the "tick test" to measure whether specialist
dealer transactions are stabilizing or destabilizing. A transaction is considered "stabiliz-
ing" if it is a purchase on a minus or zero minus tick (at a price below the previous
different transaction price) or if it is a sale on a plus or zero plus tick (at a price above
the previous different transaction price). The tick test has been criticized as an inadequate
guide in judging whether the sum of a specialist's dealings are stabilizing or destabilizing.
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to be inadequate," but the Exchange claims to have increased the
quality and quantity of its surveillance in response to that study and
the urging of the SEC."
The activities of specialists acting as brokers are regulated by
Exchange auction rules designed to ameliorate the conflict of interests
mvolved-conflicts that arise because the specialist frequently deals
as principal with those for whom he is acting as agent or as broker-
agent for opposing principals in a transaction. A specialist cannot, for
example, compete directly with his principals. 2 He cannot purchase
for his own account at a given price if he has a bid at that price on his
books nor sell at a given price if he has an offer at that price. But the
very act of market-making causes the specialist to compete indirectly
with the persons for whom he holds orders as a broker. For example, m
the above X stock hypothetical, the specialist outbid (at 218) his
own principal who had a bid on the book at 20. As the gap between the.
specialists' bid and that of his principal narrows, the fiduciary problem
obviously becomes acute. When a specialist deals with his book for
his own account, the transaction is subject to the "crossing" procedure
(a broker in the "crowd" may upset the cross by outbidding or under-
offering the specialist) and to the right of the principal's commission
broker to repudiate the transaction. The Special Study concluded that
As the Special Study points out, "[tihe tick test does no more than direct the
specialist to buy low and sell high, a course he is led to more simply by his profit incen-
tive." Sp cyar STruY 103. There will typically be some upticks in every general price
decline and some downticks in every rise. S. RoBBniS, supra note 3, at 197-99. The
Special Study found no totally satisfactory measurement of pnce trends against which
to judge a specialist's performance.
20. SPECrAL STuDy 170-71. The Exchange has been specifically criticized for directing
its surveillance primarily to instances of underparticipation (failing to deal in an reactive
stock so as to maintain a narrow bid and offer quotation), thereby ignoring the problem
of overparticipation (dealing m stocks in which trading is so active that there are few
temporary disparities in supply and demand)..
21. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release, No. 7432, Sept. 24, 1964. Both the New
York and American Stock Exchanges agreed to implement new performance tests, to
make greater use of computer technology in surveillance, and to require specialists-to
keep records on commission income and dealer profits and losses by each specialty stock
and make such records available to the Exchange on request.
There are indications that the Exchanges are in fact strengthemng their specialist
surveillance programs. The New York Stock Exchange, for example, recently announced
that it had censured and fined two specialists $25,000 each. The violation-was buying a
large block of stock as dealers on the floor without filling a broker's order for part of the
block. But in typical fashion, the Exchange sought to preserve public confidence m the
specialists system by stressing that the violations were "technical" and did not reflect
on the "specialists ability to make a market in their specialty stocks." See Wall Street
Journal, March 8, 1971, at 5, col 3.
22. SPECIAL STuDY 143-44.
853
Washington Law Review
the crossing procedure was inadequate since the specialist can wait to
cross when no one is in the "crowd" and brokers, as an accommodation
to the specialist, rarely repudiate the transaction or upset crosses.'
Mr. Ney believes that the regulatory standards are systematically
circumvented or violated by specialists who deliberately manipulate
prices up to sell long or short and down to buy or cover their short
positions. 4 Whether he is right or wrong is open to doubt. Clearly the
examples he cites do not prove his general thesis. What is disturbing
is that specialists clearly possess the power to set price trends or create
price swings at least to some extent.25 It is difficult even in theory to
distinguish when this power is properly exercised and when it is im-
properly exercised. For example, selling on upturns and buying on
downturns are exactly the kinds of stabilizing "leaning against the
wind" that specialists are supposed to undertake. Yet timed correctly,
such activity can be extremely profitable over the long-run for the
specialist. The critical question is whether the specialists cause or
accentuate the upturns and downturns, and that question appears too
difficult to resolve from afar. Mr. Ney says that they do; Exchange
propaganda, fortified generally by the findings of the Special Study,2"
assures you that they do not or cannot. The Exchange's position re-
quires a certain faith in the integrity and sense of fiduciary respon-
sibility of specialists and those who regulate specialists; Ney appeals
to the "absurdity of rules that trust to the value judgments of human
nature.27
23. Id. at 146.
24. Such deliberate manipulation would be a federal crime. See United States v. Re,
336 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1964).
25. The extent of the specialists' power is a matter of dispute among economists.
See Wolfson & Russo, supra note 11, at 714-17. To the extent that investor demand,
and hence the equilibrium price for a stock, depends on fundamental factors (such as
past earnings) their power must be considered small. But if demand is influenced sub-
stantially by technical factors (past movements of the stock's price), their power is
greater since they can use their own discretion over small incremental price changes
to create a stock price chart pattern that will evoke appropriate responses from technical
speculators. Ney is himself a chartist-mainly because he thinks specialists deliberately
manipulate prices in a pattern designed to hoodwink other chartists less sophisticated
than himself. JUNGLE 257-59.
26. The Special Study found "no widespread abuses or patterns of illegality" on the
New York Exchange. A prior SEC report on the American Stock Exchange found more
evidence of abuse. SEC, REPORT ON ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT, AND REGULATION OF
CONDUCT OF MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN STOCK ExCHANGE, 23-39 (1962). The American
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While Ney fails to prove his came that specialists engage in deliberate
manipulation, there is more substantial evidence that specialists may
profit as dealers on the basis of undisclosed material inside informa-
tion.2 8 Ney places great weight on the P. Lorillard-Schenley Industries
merger affair in 1967.29 Schenley was trading in the 60's when a false
rumor circulated that the merger had fallen through. A rash of sell
orders came in. Trading was suspended for most of March 14 but one
specialist did open the stock for one trade at the close-down 11Y8
points-in which he purchased 80,000 shares. The next day the falsity
was revealed and Schenley bounced up 114 points on buy orders.
There was no direct evidence that the specialist had any inside informa-
tion, but it has been persuasively argued that the specialist should
have continued the suspension until the rumor was cleared up-rather
than trading himself.30
Ney does emphasize certain clear defects in the regulation of special-
ists. One is the specialists' use of "segregated investment accounts." 31
All profits realized by a securities dealer such as a specialist in his
trading account are taxed as ordinary income regardless of the actual
holding period. However, under section 1236 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, a dealer can obtain capital gains treatment by (1) iden-
tifying a given security as one held for investment and (2) not holding
it primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his business.
Some specialists attempt to take advantage of section 1236 by segregat-
ing some holdings of their specialty stocks into a segregated investment
account. Whether such segregation is really effective for its avowed
tax purpose is apparently unresolved.8" The Special Study identified
this practice as an abuse"3 but the SEC was unsuccessful in eliminating
it.34 The practice clearly is an abuse for at least three reasons: First,
it gives the specialist a motive for using his unique position of knowl-
edge and subtle power of control over the price of his specialty stocks
to benefit his investment account rather than to maintain a "fair and
28. Exchange policy forbids specialists from acquiring such "inside" information.
SPECrAL STuDy 157.
29. JuNGLE 39-45.
30. Note, The Downstairs Insider: The Specialist and Rule lob-5,-42 N.Y.U.L. Rv.
695 (1967).
31. J NGLE 57-66.
32. See Rev. Rul. 160, 1964-1 Cum. BuLL. 306, 309.
33. SPEc-AL STUDY 133-35.
34. JuixGL 65; Wolfson & Russo, supra note 11, at 733.
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orderly" market. Second, it withdraws a portion of his capital and his
inventory from possible use in maintaining such a market. Finally, it
also seems to constitute an unfair use of the specialist's special exemp-
tion from the Federal Reserve Board's margin rules." The purpose of
the exemption is solely to allow specialists greater access to capital in
order to increase their ability to participate as dealers in the main-
tenance of orderly markets.
The Federal Reserve Board has finally moved to restrict the exemp-
tion from the margin rules for specialists to preclude its use for segre-
gated investment accounts. 6 However, the SEC's failure to get tough
with the Exchange on this issue has only added fuel to the flame of
critics such as Mr. Ney.
III. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
As might be expected, Ney advocates the complete elimination of
the specialist's function as a dealer and market-maker, retaining spe-
cialists only as brokers to execute limit and stop orders. 7 Indeed he
would go further and completely segregate broker and dealer functions
on the exchange."8 Members of the Exchange would act solely as
brokers, and be prohibited from trading or investing in stocks listed
on the Exchange. 9 Realistically, neither suggestion is likely to be
adopted. The Exchange has a long and successful record of convincing
Congress and the SEC that specialists, with their unique powers, are
necessary to provide a "fair and orderly" market, and no major abuses
in member trading generally have yet been exposed.
35. Regulation T of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 12 C.F.R.
§ 220.4(g).
36. See BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP., Jan. 27, 1971, at F-1.
37. JUNGLE 243-44. The SEC has statutory authority under section 11 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to accomplish such segregation by a regulation. 15 U.S.C. § 78K(b)
(1964). Stock exchanges in other countries function in a variety of ways. The Paris
Bourse seems to approximate Ney's model of an all-broker exchange with no specialists
or dealer members. 2 L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1221.
38. JUNGLE 245. Such segregation would require an Act of Congress. Section 11 only
empowers the SEC to preclude floor trading and to prevent "excessive" off-floor trading
by members.
39. The Special Study found that "[tirading by NYSE members on the exchange but
from off the floor accounts for approximately 5 percent of total exchange purchases and
sales.... ." SPECIAL STUDY 246. It concluded that little is really known about such trading
other than that it is done for a variety of purposes-personal investment, arbitrage,
block-positioning, etc. In executing such trades, the member enjoys commission rates
lower than those paid by the public.
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As a second-best solution Ney proposes that specialists make full
disclosure of their dealer trading and profits in their specialty stocks.40
With that I wholly concur. As Ney points out, the officers, directors
and major shareholders of publicly-held corporations must regularly
disclose their holdings of their corporation's stock and, any changes
therein.41 Specialists are not corporate insiders,42 but they do in effect
and by representation operate as fiduciaries for the investors and
potential investors in the corporation's stock. As fiduciaries, they can
have no legitimate claim to financial privacy. Reporting of trading
profits and the summarized result of the various Exchange surveillance
tests of specialist performance would at least inform the investment
community of the cost of maintaining a "fair and orderly" market.
On a broader plain, the fundamental question today on, the status
of the major exchanges is not whether they should operate with or with-
out specialists but whether they can or should continue to exist at all
in their present form-that is, as auction markets taking place at a
single physical location in New York. An exchange market for a given
stock is a natural monopoly.43 Hence the need for a centralized market
for a given stock is clear. However, with the advent of modern com-
munications, especially the computer, it is becoming increasingly clear
that centralization no longer means spatial concentration. In this
respect, the experience with the NASDAQ4 system, a computer-
based, nationwide quotation network for over-the-counter stocks, could
have a major impact. As it is now constructed, NASDAQ merely "com-
puterizes" the existing over-the-counter market in which dealers make
markets in given stocks and brokers execute buy or sell orders for their
40. JUNGL= 245-46. The Special Study suggested full public disclosure, but again the
SEC was unable or unwilling to obtain the acquiescence of the Exchange. SPcEr.A STUDY
170. At present, specialists are under a duty of disclosure only to the regulatory authori-
ties of the Exchange themselves.
41. Securities Exchange Act § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964).
42. The Special Study was critical of the relationships maintained between specialists
and insiders of companies in whose stock they specialize. SPEcTA_. STUDY 157-60. Exchange
policy now prohibits specialists from serving as commission brokers for such insiders.
43. See Baxter, NYSE Fixed Commission Rates: A Private Cartel Goes Public,' 22
STAx. L. REv. 675, 703-04 (1970).
44. NASDAQ is the acronym for National Association of Securities Dealers Auto-
mated Quotation system. NASD is a self-regulatory association of broker-dealers who
deal mainly in over-the-counter (OTC) stocks (i.e., those not listed on any securities
exchanges). The NASD is registered under Section ISA of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78(o) (3) (1964). Firms Which are members of the major exchanges
usually are also members of the NASD since they handle OTC as well as listed stocks
for their customers.
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customers at the dealer's offer or bid quotation.45 At present, the
NASDAQ system does not include stocks listed on the stock ex-
changes.46 However, the system or one like it can easily be expanded to
include all stocks and be restructured to allow direct communication
of bids and offers and even the direct execution of trades between
brokers or indeed between investors themselves.4T If such a system is
implemented and proves to be more efficient than floor auction ex-
changes, such exchanges will no longer continue to exist in their present
form.48
45. NASDAQ is programmed to operate on three "levels". Level I is informational. It
can retrieve current median bid and offered quotations by market-makers for any stock
in the system. An investor's broker can thus supply up-to-the-minute price information
similar to what is available for listed stocks. Level II allows the broker to retrieve an
actual current quote from any market-maker. Level III is the one into which market-
makers enter their quotations. No actual executions are effected through the NASDAQ
system. The broker must communicate directly with the market-maker by telephone or
otherwise. See BNA SEC. R o. & L. REP., Feb. 10, 1971, at A-12-A-13.
46. There is no legal restriction on the inclusion of listed stocks in the system.
Broker-dealers who are not members of the exchange on which a stock is listed can and
sometimes do make a market or effect executions in such a stock (the so-called "third
market"). Up to the present, the "third market" has been generally confined to large
block transactions in which OTC broker-dealers could profitably undercut the minimum
commissions charged on the Exchanges. This competitive advantage has been lessened by
the SEC's moves to abolish minimum commissions on large blocks. See Wall Street
Journal, April 2, 1971, at 30, col. 1. But with a system such as NASDAQ, third market
competition could run deeper with OTC market-makers, for example, offering better
quotations than the specialists on the exchanges.
The decision to exclude listed stocks from NASDAQ was actually an eleventh hour
affair. An OTC broker-dealer, Shumate & Company, Inc. of Dallas, has brought an anti-
trust suit, charging the exclusion was dictated by stock exchange member firms that
dominate the Board of Governors of the NASD. See BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP., Dec. 23,
1970, at E-1-E-4. The decision to exclude listed securities may be altered. See Wall Street
Journal, Jan. 21, 1971, at 3, col. 2. Indeed, under the pressure of the Shumate antitrust
suit and from members of Congress, the NASD decided to include 36 exchange-listed
securities on NASDAQ on an experimental basis. See BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP., March
17, 1971, at A-2; Wall Street Journal, March 15, 1971, at 5, col. 1.
47. For example, the INSTINET system (Institutional Networks Corporation) is
programmed for direct execution of transactions among large institutional investors. See
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8661, August 4, 1969. As the Release notes,
computer systems present regulatory problems and may constitute stock exchanges or
broker-dealers within the meaning of the Securities Exchange Act. The Release proposes
for adoption a rule that requires SEC approval of any "automated trading information
system." NASDAQ would be exempted since the NASD assumes regulatory responsibility
for the operation of the system.
48. The Exchanges are, of course, being pressured to move to computerization them-
selves. The New York Stock Exchange has implemented the BAS (Block Automation
System) that allows communication of interest in large blocks by member firms and in-
stitutional investors. Direct communications between investors is not allowed, however,
and executions are subject to normal exchange rules (that is, normally they must cross
on the floor). See SEC Release, supra note 47.
The regional stock exchanges are considering an "electronic linkup" which would
eliminate the floor auction. See Wall Street Journal, March 19, 1971, at 5, col. 1.
858
